This paper introduces a new information density indicator to provide a more comprehensive understanding of price reactions to news and, more specifically, to the sources of jumps in financial markets. Our information density indicator, which measures the abnormal amount of noisy "ticker" news before scheduled macroeconomic announcements, is significantly related to the likelihood of price jumps and independent of the magnitude of news surprises or pre-announcement trading activity. We therefore interpret this variable as a measure of additional uncertainty in the market, which is resolved by macroeconomic news as "hard" facts.
Introduction
The fundamental question of how information impacts asset prices takes center stage in the financial literature on asset pricing (Fama (1965) ). In financial markets, investors are permanently flooded by a variety of information such as corporate earnings, macroeconomic announcements, and political news. As investors update their expectations about the economy and asset prices based on such information, it is of particular interest to know more about the relationship between asset returns and the quality of information that is provided by the news industry. This paper contributes to the literature on informational efficiency by analyzing how noisy information prior to public announcements affects price changes in asset markets at the time when this "hard" information is released.
Our study is based on a theoretical framework, which includes both the emergence of noisy information prior to macroeconomic announcements and the release of the public announcement itself. With a setup of information being considered as a composition of price-relevant signals and price-irrelevant noise, with the latter hindering inference about the former, our approach is related to Veronesi (2000) and Li (2005) . Both authors refer to Detemple (1986) who employs a learning framework in the presence of incomplete information.
With the theoretical concept of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in the presence of noise, Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) , Admati (1985) and Kim and Verrecchia (1991a,b) carried out studies about how noisy information affects price formation.
1 In contrast, our theoretical framework provides an explanation for changes in asset prices due to an increasing flow of noisy information. We define abnormal noise by an increase in the number of ticker information above the prior average information flow. The vast bulk of news (or news types) on the ticker has no systematic relation to jumps in the asset markets. Additionally, it cannot be interpreted as a source of jumps in an economically meaningful sense. However, interestingly, the abnormal amount of unspecific and noisy economic news flows before macroeconomic announcements itself explains the likelihood of jumps. Theoretically, we define the noise as information that is irrelevant to the price aggregation can help explain empirical asset pricing puzzles, i.e., large volatility in equity prices and large spreads on corporate default. Chen, Diltz, Huang, and Lung (2011) empirically study the efficiency of trading behavior in stock and option markets upon the arrival of noisy signals. Thereby, the authors defined buy and sell recommendations, which are derived from CNBC's Mad Money, as a proxy for noisy information. They conclude that option prices react more efficiently, i.e., less responsive, to noisy information than stock prices. This is due to the fact that informed traders dominate in option markets.
Our paper aims at a broader understanding of news flows and its impact on price jumps. We expand previous literature in several ways. Firstly, we develop a new variable to capture noise, which we label the Information Density Indicator (IDI) . This is independent of the magnitude of the macroeconomic surprise or pre-announcement trading activity, highly statistically significant, and of economic importance. We interpret this new variable as a measure of additional uncertainty in the market, which is resolved through macroeconomic announcements classified as "hard" facts. Consequently, the aim of our paper goes beyond the link between macroeconomic news and price jumps. Secondly, while we do not define an explicit model of noisy rational expectations equilibrium, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to empirically test a theoretical framework that explains the impact of noisy information on asset prices.
2 Our results show that an increasing flow of noisy information prior to the release of a public announcement raises the likelihood of a price jump. The results are robust to various test designs. Thirdly, we explicitly distinguish between jumps that can be related to only one macroeconomic announcement and jumps that are driven by simultaneous macroeconomic announcements. Previous literature has analyzed co-jumps in several assets but-to the best of the authors' knowledge-failed to cover the case of jumps that coincide with more than one macroeconomic announcement. If one distinguishes between multi-announcement jumps with and without conflicting news surprises, previous estimates on sources of price jumps seem to be conservatively underestimated. We base our analysis on bond and stock futures from the U.S. and German market with the FX rate as a linkage. We use macroeconomic data from the U.S., Germany and the Eurozone, which expands common data sources of previous jump literature.
Our test of the noisy information model provides important insights into price changes around public announcements. The empirical results imply that analysts' forecasts and other relevant signals can be diluted by noisy information and the price mechanism is distorted until the public information is released. It demonstrates that abnormal levels of news flows lead to a higher uncertainty prior to a scheduled announcement. Hence, our results have important implications for asset pricing, hedging strategies, portfolio diversification, and risk management.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 refers to the noisy information framework that provides the theoretical foundation for explaining how increasingly noisy information leads to price jumps in asset markets. Section 3 presents the dataset, introduces the jump identification methodology, and shows descriptive statistics on intraday jumps. In Section 4, we formally introduce our information density indicator as a measure of abnormal noise. Here, we analyze its role in predicting the likelihood of price jumps that are conditional on public announcements. We further test our results for robustness against a variety of different model and parameter specifications. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
In a world where information and news flows have become increasingly dynamic, we propose to study the effects of both, hard facts that are delivered by scheduled macroeconomic announcements and the magnitude of the preceding news flows. We expect that some consensus or market expectations are already priced-in and, if the announcement does not contain any surprise, the prices will not move much. To disentangle and study the two effects, we propose a general market microstructure model for risky assets with information uncertainty and announcements effects.
Let us consider a scheduled macroeconomic announcement at time t, A t,k . Trading occurs in any asset i, which can be affected by the beliefs about this fundamental value prior to its arrival as well as the actual value at the point in time when the "hard" information (announcement) is released. Market participants are equipped with inventory I t−1,i , which should reflect their desired level of inventory I * i . If no new information arrives at the market, traders have no incentive to alter asset holdings, i.e. E t−1 [∆I t,i ] = 0.
3 As it can be assumed that prices are already conditioned on a forecast
of the macroeconomic announcement, it follows that
Under the assumption of an informational efficient asset market, the best forecast of the price for the next period is the previous price:
Nonetheless, traders are aware that the price may change according to unpredictable random disturbances ε t,i :
However, since we often see an increasing amount of news coming to the markets before macroeconomic announcements are released, it is essential to not only consider the impact of the announcement itself but also the effects that news flows have on prices prior to an announcement. This information flow is denoted as φ t−1 and can contain price-relevant signals Θ t−1,i for asset i, which affect its intrinsic value, (P t−1,i |Θ t−1,i ), as well as priceirrelevant elements, which are deemed to be, at least for asset i, informational noise ζ t−1,i . While this approach reflects the "signal equals fundamentals plus noise" argument as used in Detemple (1986) and subsequently in Veronesi (2000) , our information set is defined analogously as signal plus noise specification. This leads us to the definition of a noisy price, based on the information flow:
Given the dynamics of the news industry and financial markets, we can consider that the noise component varies considerably over time. We can define the precision of the signal to be 1/ζ t−1,i . Thus, if ζ t−1,i is large, we consider the quality of information to go down, i.e. the precision of the signal decreases and vice versa. 4 By incorporating the signal into in the context of holding inventory, see, e.g., Savor and Wilson (2013, 2014) ). 4 Note that we explicitly focus on the effect of information quality, however, we refrain from analyzing how prices are affected by marginal costs of acquiring information and the degree of risk tolerance. If the marginal costs of information gathering are higher and the risk tolerance is lower, investors will acquire less precise information. We refer to Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) for a closer analysis of the impacts of these factors. expectation formation, the posterior expectation can be derived from the forecast-based prior in a Bayesian manner:
being the weight of the price conjecture based on the observed news flow. In this setting, the precision of information, 1/ζ t−1,i , is defined relative to the reciprocal of the sum of uncertainty, which arises from the normal variation in the price, σ 2 ε,i , and uncertainty, which arises from the noisiness of the signals ζ t−1,i . This relationship forms the weight π t−1,i of the signal-based price when traders update their prior beliefs based on the forecast.
5 As different investors may differ in their access to the news flow and their abilities to read out signals in the presence of noise, as well as in the ways of pricing-in these signals, it can be assumed that traders act according to their individual expectations. Thus, Equation (3) can be seen as an aggregated statement, which is averaged over all of the market participants.
Before we impose the effect of the announcement, we need to take into account that the updated expectations will affect the market and trigger the true value to change. Due to the fact that this revaluation by the market will typically take some time, we introduce time intervals into our model. Hence, we consider the intrinsic value P t−τ,i at the immediate instant of time before the release of the announcement at t − τ , which naturally is a function of recent relevant developments Θ t−1 incorporated in the news:
However, the noise in the information that covers the relevant signals hinders the expectation to be closer to this new intrinsic value:
From these considerations, it is obvious that the more information is overlaid with noise, 5 Note that this corresponds to standard market microstructure models with, for example,P t−1 = P * t−1 + ω t−1 , where the private information signals of a true value P * t−1 are denoted as ω t−1 . The weight would result as
, with the signal uncertainty σ 2 ω,i (see Madhavan and Smidt (1991) ). In our definition, the signal uncertainty σ 2 ω,i is directly represented by ζ t−1 , and also reflects time-varying uncertainty.
6 the more the expected price deviates from its new intrinsic value. If, on aggregate, market participants trade on the noisy information and thereby only partially price-in the new information, due to its reduced weight in the updating process, the market price at t − τ can be written as
To complete our noisy information model, which takes into account the two effects that arise from noisy information and hard facts, we further introduce the arrival of a public announcement as another source of price impact. With (P t,i |A t,k ) being the price that incorporates the release of the macroeconomic announcement, the new price reflects all of the information including the hard facts. With regard to the magnitude and direction of the price change, we can assume that the larger the surprise in the announcement,
A t,k −F t−1,k , the higher the difference between the actual price, (P t |A t,k ), and the expected price based on the forecast, E t−1 (P t,i |F t−1,k ). As the direction of the announcement effect depends on the type of the macroeconomic variable, the news surprise should be positively correlated with the magnitude of the absolute price change:
Regarding the influence of the preceding news flow, we have to take into account both the expectation dispersion E t−1 (P t,i |F t−1,k )−E t−1 (P t,i |φ t−1 ) and the weight of its factor within the process of expectation updating. However, for any given level of dispersion, a higher noise leads to a smaller effect of the news flow and a posteriori closer adjustment to the forecast-based expectation. This is due to the reduced weight of the information-based expectation when noise is high. Note that the stickiness of the price expectation indicates that, on aggregate, the price does not adapt to the new intrinsic price. Hence, the price discovery after the announcement should be stronger. For this to hold a significant change in the intrinsic value is not necessary. This is because the lower bound of this effect is zero, even if no signals are contained in the information. Therefore, we expect a positive impact of noise that is contained in the new information set on the magnitude of the price change. As the fractions Θ t−1,i and ζ t−1,i are not observable, we assume that the amount of relevant signals is naturally limited and an increase in φ t−1 = Θ t−1,i + ζ t−1,i is merely reflective of higher ζ t−1,i . Consequently, the expected influence of new information can be formalized as:
As a result of the effects arising from both, noisy information and scheduled macroeconomic announcements, the change in the price should be considerably strong, as market participants will adhere to take up the deferred adjustment to the intrinsic value as well as the price effect of the announcement surprise. This makes the study suitable for identifying jumps in prices in the presence of macroeconomic announcements.
Another reason to study price jumps is related to the result from our theoretical framework. Our results show that, in the presence of noise, it will be harder for representative traders to infer and act on signals. Thus, prices will be sticky until the uncertainty is resolved after the release of the announcement. However, as shown by Li (2005) ), noisy information can also lead to estimation errors, thereby affecting risk premia and stock return volatility. In particular, the latter effect may be at work if prices are moved prior to the announcement. This reduces the stickiness of the price, and leads to a deviation for which we cannot make an assumption regarding size and direction. Another possibility for some prior adjustments might arise from risk-considerations when holding assets over announcement periods, as studied in Savor and Wilson (2013, 2014) . Finally, this approach makes the analysis robust to possibly occurring partial adjustments and revelations. This is because adjustment of the price after the announcement can be seen as fully-revealing of all of the information that was in the market.
In order to obtain unbiased results, we control for further influences. To account for time-varying volatility and thus, to avoid possible estimation errors mentioned in the previous paragraph, we additionally consider σ 2 ε,t−1,i . Note that this reflects the randomness ε t−1,i in the price movements prior to the announcement. Furthermore, trading activity can also play a role. This is because many market participants, who are characterized by heterogeneous deals, may trade prior to an announcement. Hence, we further control for the deals, d t−1,i , leaving the noise measure as reflective of the pure information effect. While Jiang, Lo, and Verdelhan (2011) use pure (il)liquidity measures and find that jump probabilities increase (decrease) with greater bid-ask spreads (order book depth), we measure trading activity without assuming that it indeed reflects liquidity, but rather controls for market activity. This is due to the fact that only by using trading activity and testing for its relationship with the noise in the market provides us with a viable control in line with the theoretical model: As we defined E t−1 [∆I t,i ] = 0 in cases where no new information arrives that would trigger an expected price change, 8 there is no incentive to trade. If the measures for noisy information and trading activity are not positively correlated, this would provide evidence that our information density indicator does not, indeed, contain price-relevant information. Furthermore, if trading activity is high, we expect this to increase the probability of a price jump holding all other effects constant. Thus, the inclusion of the deals measure enables a further test of validity of our assumptions. This greatly enhances the reliability of testing our theoretical framework for the following reasoning: if noise and deals variables are both relevant and of the expected direction, we can conclude that the increase in trading should not be reflective of more relevant signals.
Taking into account several different macroeconomic announcements demands for their standardization. Since we are not primarily interested in the direction of the effects, we define the surprise indicator in absolute values. This leads us to the final specification:
Note that Equation (7) states the relationship between the level of noisy information and the likelihood rather than the size of a significant price change.
6 Technically speaking, a jump is defined as the difference between realized volatility and a realized bi-power variation at a specific point of time t (see Subsection 3.2 for a discussion on jump identification).
Data and Jump Identification
In this section, we describe our data and the jump identification methodology. We then link the significant price jumps to macroeconomic announcements.
Data
Existing literature almost exclusively focuses on U.S. assets and U.S. macroeconomic news.
7 Besides the U.S. markets, we additionally include the German bond and equity market as well as the EUR/USD exchange rate. We chose Germany to represent the European markets as it has highly liquid bond and equity futures markets and the trading hours overlap with the U.S. markets. 8 As further sources of price jumps we included macroeconomic news from Germany and the European Union. This allows us to analyze news (vs. non-news) related jumps across assets, regions and different origins of macroeconomic announcements. Table 1 summarizes our dataset of macroeconomic announcements.
<<< Table 1 about here >>> For our analysis of the U.S. and German equity and bond markets, as well as the USD/EUR exchange rate, we collected raw tick-by-tick data for the S&P 500 E-Mini, the 10-year Treasury note and the DAX and Bund futures, as well as for the EUR/USD spot rate. The futures for the bonds and stock markets are more liquid than their underlying markets and lead their cash markets. 9 For the exchange rate we choose spot market data from the EBS/ICAP. EBS/ICAP is the largest electronic trading platform for the major currency pairs that operates 24 hours per day. Its liquidity is higher than for the EUR/USD future.
10
Our sample covers the six-year period from January 2006 to December 2011. We converted all of the data to Eastern Standard Time (EST) and accounted for the switch to Daylight Saving Time in the US and Europe. DAX and Bund futures are traded from 02:00 to 16:00 EST and a 10-year Treasury note is quoted from 18:00 to 16:00 EST, i.e., 22 hours per day (in New York, Tokyo, and London). Meanwhile, the EUR/USD exchange rate and the S&P 500 E-Mini futures are traded all day. For futures data, we use the contract closest to maturity and roll over when the next maturity contract becomes more actively traded. We transformed the raw data into equidistant five-minute return intervals, r j (i) = log(p j /p j−1 ), where p j denotes the price (measured in local currency) of the last trade in the j-th interval. We ignored opening returns to avoid contamination from overnight news. As it is standard in this literature, we use the Market News International (MNI) database. MNI is the premier source for real time capital market related news. For our six-year observation period it contains approximately 655,000 news entries.
Jump Identification
In recent years, much progress has been made in the theoretical and empirical identification of price jumps (see, e.g., Lee and Mykland (2008) ; Tauchen and Zhou (2011) ). A recent strand of empirical research links price jumps to macroeconomic announcements. Dungey, McKenzie, and Smith (2009) and Lahaye, Laurent, and Neely (2011) were among the first to empirically detect intraday jumps that coincide with macroeconomic announcements.
To identify significant jumps, we apply jump detection techniques that have been adopted from recent literature (e.g., Evans (2011)).
11 As originally introduced by Merton (1971) and now widely applied in research on jump identification (e.g., Andersen, Bollerslev and Diebold (2007); Lee and Mykland (2008) ), we assume a continuous time-jump diffusion process with a logarithmic price process as follows:
The logarithmic asset price consists of three components. The variable µ(t) describes a continuous locally bound variation process. σ(t) is a strictly positive stochastic volatility process with a Wiener process W (t). J(t) refers to the respective jump size combined with a binomial counting process q(t), which takes the value one when there is a jump at time t. Since we are not able to observe continuous sample paths for asset prices in reality, we divide the sample period into equidistant δ-periods of high-frequency returns. We then use the discrete sample prices, which is a standard proceeding in empirical research. The daily realized variation is captured in the sum of the corresponding 1/δ high-frequency intraday squared returns, given in the non-parametric measure of the realized variation (RV ):
The compounding return of the respective asset j is implied by r
is the price of asset j at time t i . Following Jacod and Shiryaev (1987) as well as Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys (2003) , we assume that RV is a consistent estimator of the total variance, including both the continuous and the jump component J :
Equation (10) represents the continuous sample path and the jump component of the total return variation. When there are no jumps present, the realized volatility equals the integrated variance. In the presence of jumps, the realized volatility equals the integrated variance and the cumulative sum of the squared jumps.
As introduced by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) , the realized bipower variation (BV ) captures the continuous price movement. It is defined as the scaled summation of the product of the respective adjacent absolute returns:
where k defines the size of the rolling window. With the combination of the realized volatility and the realized bipower variation in Equations (10) and (11), the continuous and discontinuous components of the quadratic variations can be separated and the contribution of the jump component J can be extracted:
In the following, we apply the jump identification methodology introduced by Lee and Mykland (2008) . 12 In doing so, we set our rolling window k to five trading days.
13 To test at time t whether a jump in the price data of the respective asset occurred or not, we use the following test statistic L j (i):
Upon this test statistic L j (i), Lee and Mykland (2008) derived the following test statistic and corresponding critical value. The null hypothesis that there is no jump in the price data in the interval
The constants C kj and S kj are given by the following equations:
The constant c is approximately equal to 0.7979 (c ≡ 2/π). The critical value is based on the 99th-percentile of a Gumbel distribution. We follow previous empirical papers on jump identification and choose a return frequency of five minutes to avoid most market microstructure noise (e.g., Evans (2011); Jiang, Lo, and Verdelhan (2011); Bongaerts, Roll, Rösch, Van Dijk, and Yuferova (2014) ). This ensures that effects such as highfrequency trading, short-term anomalies, or bid-ask bounces will not contaminate our results. Table 2 provides the summary statistics for the five-minute returns and the significant jumps for each asset class. We find the most jumps for the DAX futures (864), followed 12 In several pre-tests, we compared different jump identification methodologies. With the approach that was suggested by Lee and Mykland (2008) , the number of misspecified jumps is minimized. This confirms the results of Hanousek, Kocenda, and Novotny (2012) . 13 We further applied alternative window sizes ranging from three to 20 days. At a window size of five trading days, the amount of spuriously identified jumps is minimized.
Descriptive Statistics on Price Jumps
by the 10-year Treasury note futures (797) and Bund futures (794) with almost the same number of jumps, and a slightly lesser count for S&P 500 E-Mini (670) and the EUR/USD exchange rate (614).
14 <<< Table 2 about here >>> Previous theoretical and empirical work (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998); Veronesi (1999) ) suggests that, on average, investors react more strongly to negative than to positive news. Moreover, our sample covers the subprime and Euro crisis. Therefore, we expect to see more negative than positive jumps in the equity and bond markets. This asymmetry is confirmed by our results. It is most pronounced in the DAX futures, where negative jumps outweigh positive ones by more than 90 percent. In the EUR/USD exchange rate, we see an almost identical number of positive (306) and negative (308) jumps.
15
As the jump detection procedure identifies jumps conditional on the underlying local volatility, markets with higher volatility should exhibit jumps of higher magnitudes. On average, we see the largest absolute jumps in the more volatile equity markets with (absolute) jump sizes of 0.53 percent (DAX) and 0.51 percent (S&P), while the smallest jumps are observed in the bond markets (US Treasury 0.21 percent and Bund 0.16 percent) which also have the lowest volatility. As positive and negative jumps are of a similar size in each asset, we conclude-due to the mechanics of the jump identification procedure-that positive and negative jumps occur at comparable levels of local volatility. All maxima and minima in the five-minute intervals were identified as jumps. Figure 1 illustrates the intraday frequencies of jumps for our five assets. For all of the assets, we find pronounced peaks at 08:30 and 10:00 EST, when many US macroeconomic announcements are released. In the US Treasury Futures, we observe a third peak at around 13:00 EST. The EUR/USD exchange rate (24 hours of trading) also shows sparsely distributed jumps during the illiquid trading times (e.g., during Asian trading hours).
Although the S&P Future is traded 22 hours a day, jumps are almost confined to the liquid trading times. Table 3 shows the number of jumps for each asset that coincide with the various macroeconomic announcements within the five-minute return intervals.
<<< Figure 1 about here >>>

Jumps Conditional on Macroeconomic Announcements
<<< Table 3 about here >>>
In total, we included 51 different macroeconomic announcements in our analysis (see Table 1 ). The selection of macroeconomic announcements is mainly guided by literature (see, e.g., Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) ; Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) ; Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007) ). However, we expand the set of announcements that are used in previous literature and additionally include news from the EMU and Germany. This is because jumps in the German assets, as well as the exchange rate, are often associated with news from the EMU and Germany. We also observe some jumps in the U.S. assets, which can be linked to macroeconomic news from the EMU and Germany.
16
Almost half (48.4 percent) of all jumps in the U.S. Treasury Futures can be linked to macroeconomic announcements which is the highest ratio among all five assets. By far, the two most important announcements are Initial Jobless Claims and Non-Farm Payrolls.
17 They account for about one third of all of the macroeconomic announcements that can be related to significant jumps. Although the ratio of significant jumps with macroeconomic announcement is lower for the S&P Futures (29.0 percent) compared to the U.S. Treasury futures, the results are similar in the sense that labor market related news is most important.
16 Macroeconomic data from other European countries seem to play no role in explaining jumps in our five assets. In rare events, we could link political statements (in particular from Bernanke/FED and Trichet/ECB) to jumps in the markets, but with hardly any overlap to our sample periods. Note further that, since we use bond and equity futures indices in our empirical analysis, microeconomic fundamentals for individual stocks, such as earnings and analysts' recommendations, can be neglected, which primarily drives unsystematic price jumps as shown by Lee (2012) . 17 To control for a dominant impact of these announcements on our main results we re-run our analysis without these macroeconomic indicators in the robustness Sub-section 4.3
The German DAX Futures react to macroeconomic news from the U.S., Germany, and the EMU. With 28.7 percent, the coincidence ratio is almost identical to that of the S&P Futures. In the DAX Futures, more than half of all significant news is from Germany, with the most important ones being the Producer Price Index, Trade Balance, Retail and Wholesale Prices. 18 The coincidence ratio for the Bund Futures is approximately 39 percent, with U.S. announcements being slightly more important than German announcements.
For the EUR/USD currency pair, the results look similar to the Bund Futures. Approximately 41 percent of the jumps can be linked to macroeconomic announcements with US news being the most important. About 12 percent of the jumps are associated to German and EMU news, with the German IFO Business Climate alone accounting for 4 percent of the jumps. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics on jumps corresponding to macroeconomic announcements and jumps that could not be linked to macroeconomic announcements. We see slightly higher means and standard deviations for announcementdriven jumps, but no clear pattern concerning the extreme values across the different assets. However, minimal jumps in absolute values are always higher when there is no public announcement. This indicates that negative jumps, which are conditional on announcements, show lower absolute values compared to negative jumps when other news are released (such as firm-specific information) or important events occur, respectively. Obviously, the skewness for jumps that are conditional on announcements tends to be more positive than for the non-announcement case. In this section, we describe our estimation model and introduce our measure for information density prior to macroeconomic announcements. We then present our empirical results and report various robustness checks.
<<<
Estimation Strategy
To analyze the role of information density ahead of macroeconomic announcements in explaining price jumps, let us recall from Section 2 the theoretical noisy information model:
which can be restated for the empirical estimation in the following probit model specification:
where P rob denotes the probability that a jump occurs conditional on a scheduled macroeconomic announcement. Our dependent variable is a binary indicator, which takes the value of one when there is a jump and zero, otherwise, i.e. we are interested in whether the increase of noisy information affects the probability of a price jump. In the following, we discuss the chosen variables in detail.
SU R t,k (news surprise) and IDI t−1 (information density indicator) are our two informational variables. The former is the surprise in the macroeconomic announcement and the latter reflects the increased noise in the market prior to the release of an announcement. DLS t−1,i and V LA t−1,i control for the trading activity and volatility, respectively. As it is difficult to interpret the size of a jump with respect to the level of noise or news surprise, we refrain from deriving the marginal effects of our IDI measure on the absolute price jump from OLS estimation. . According to our model and based on the rational expectation theory, only unexpected information has an impact on market prices. In line with Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) , Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) , and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007) , we define the announcement surprise as follows:
where A t,k is the actual value of the announcement k, F t−1,k is the market expectation of the announcement k indicated by the median forecast in the MNI database, andσ k is the sample standard deviation of the news surprise, given by A t,k − F t−1,k .
Information Density Indicator. To operationalize noise, ζ t−1,i , from Equation (2), and thus, analyze the impact of information density before macroeconomic announcements arrive at the market, we developed a new variable which we labeled information density indicator (IDI) . The IDI measures the abnormal amount of news flows before the release of public announcements.
19 It represents the relation of the amount of news items during the last ten minutes before the announcement interval and the preceding news flow. 20 Formally, we define it analogously to the liquidity shock variable in Jiang, Lo, and Verdelhan (2011) . Note that the IDI measure only captures the sheer number of news items but not their relevance or quality, respectively. In our theoretical framework, we assumed that the unobservable amount of relevant signals is limited and so, the news flow is dominated by time-varying noise. Thus, the IDI can be considered as a measure for noise shocks:
where the mean of incoming news items (N ews t−i ) over five five-minute periods (from t − 2 to t − 6),
N ews t−i , is subtracted from the amount of incoming news during the ten minutes before an announcement (N ews t−1 ), standardized by the sample standard deviation, σ N ews (see Figure 2 for illustration purpose). 21 We define the period for the 19 To capture a more general news flow effect on jumps, we tried various specification of our measure.
In doing so, we vary the construction of our IDI measure depending on alternative specifications with regard to the window size, and hence, the corresponding standardization. By construction, the presented IDI measure closely follows the news surprise and the liquidity variable, for which we also define similar time intervals. 20 Most announcements occur during the first half of the five-minute intervals. This leaves some time for the price process to correct "overshooting reactions" and reach their state of equilibrium. This renders our approach even more defensive in terms of measuring the jumps conditional to the expected effects, and leaves the pure price discovery impact for the analysis. Thereby, we also assume that there are no effects coming from abnormal noise immediately after the release of a public announcement to omit biased estimates. This approach is also robust to possibly remaining uncertainty that was not related to the announcement uncertainty. 21 Figure 3 , which shows rolling window estimates for the IDI measure ahead of macroeconomic an-noise shock prior to the announcement as intervals of ten minutes rather than of five minutes to guarantee a more stable measure. The second term in the nominator of Equation (17) measures the normal level of information flow in the respective preceding time period. Hence, it is the first term that specifies whether there is a deviation from normality and the size of this deviation indicates the increase of information. More precisely, in line with our definition of limited (if any) price-relevant signals in the news flow, our IDI variable measures the excess or abnormal level of noise.
<<< Figure 2 about here >>>
Note that, in this exemplary illustration, there is already some price movement before the announcement. From our theoretical model, we do not consider these movements to be large and mainly being randomly occurring. Furthermore, we control for general movements and increased volatility. Hence, whether there are some movements in between or not is not of major importance for our analysis, especially as we focus on jumps rather than price changes. Figure 3 also empirically indicates the pattern of increasing information density prior to an announcement. This shows the rolling window estimates for the evolution of the IDI measure for a one-hour period ahead of macroeconomic announcements (t − 12 to t − 7; t − 11 to t − 6; . . . ; t − 7 to t − 2). In the case of jumps, it increases substantially during the time period of one hour before an announcement, whereas it remains at about the same level in the case of no jumps.
<<< Figure 3 about here >>> Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the IDI measure. Whenever a macroeconomic announcement follows, the mean IDI is higher before the jumps compared to the announcements without jumps, for all five assets. The standard deviation of the IDI measure with and without a subsequent jump is about the same. This also applies to the min/max values. The IDIs before jumps are highly negatively skewed, compared to the IDIs without jumps. This points to more observations with large IDI values, which is also underpinned by a slightly higher kurtosis.
<<< Table 5 about here >>> nouncements, also empirically indicates this pattern of increasing information density prior to an announcement. Figure 4 shows the average IDI over a trading period of 24 hours. It does not exhibit pronounced peaks as we find them with the jump frequencies across the trading day in Figure 1 .
<<< Figure 4 about here >>> Control Variables. As in Mizrach and Neely (2008) and Jiang, Lo, and Verdelhan (2011), we use two variables to control the contribution of trading effects and volatility to price jumps. 22 The first variable DLS t−1 captures a deals shock in the trading of the asset before the announcement:
DLS t−1 measures the difference between the number of deals in the five-minute interval prior to the announcement (t − 1) and the mean of deals over the intervals t − 6 to t − 2, divided by their standard deviation. Thus, it serves as a measure capturing trading activity shocks.
The second control variable V LA t−1 represents the realized volatility in the interval 30 minutes until five minutes before the announcement:
The volatility measure of the market is calculated as the standard deviation of the fiveminute log returns from t − 6 to t − 1, multiplied by the square root of the window size. Table 6 shows the correlation between our independent variables. Bravais Pearson's correlation coefficients range between -0.114 and +0.156. This indicates that multicollinearity does not seem to affect the inference statistics and our estimation results. For most of the assets the highest correlations are observed between News Surprise and Volatility (0.087 to 0.148), with the exception of Treasury Note Futures, for which the linear dependency between volatility and IDI is 0.156. However, the correlation coefficients between News Surprise and IDI are 0.01 or less in all five assets.
22 Besides the deals variable (DLS), in our analysis, we further included the variable "transaction volume"
(standardized similarly to DLS). Since DLS and transaction volume were highly correlated, we excluded the latter one. 23 288 five minute intervals equal to 24 hours, which we use as window size.
<<< Table 6 about here >>> Note that the correlations near zero are good news not only in terms of econometrics but also, at this stage, it indicates that our model setup disentangles the different effects. For example, the low correlation between the surprise and information density indicator allows for a fully separate identification of these effects. Also, the low correlation between the trade shock and the information density indicator leaves our construction valid. This is because increased trading before an announcement is not driven by the news, as higher news flows should reflect higher noise and not price-relevant signals, which would induce transactions.
Empirical Results
The estimation results for the probit model specifications according to Equation (15.2) are shown in Table 7 . We start with a parsimonious model by only including our main covariates-N ewsSurprise and IDI. We then add our control variables for trading activity and volatility. We report HAC-robust standard errors for all regressions, since our IDI measure is based on a rolling window approach.
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<<< Table 7 about here >>> First of all, the intercept in all regressions of Table 7 is negative and highly significant. Economically speaking, this means that without taking into account news surprise, abnormal noise, excess trading activity, and volatility, a price jump in the five asset markets is very unlikely. In contrast, for all five assets (and all model variations) the coefficients of the news surprise variable SUR and our IDI measure are significant at the 1 percent level with a persistent positive sign, i.e. the probability of a price jump increases with growing abnormal noise prior to the public announcement. This is in line with our theoretical hypotheses in Section 2. The magnitude of the SUR and IDI coefficients remains almost unchanged across the different model specifications, and only slightly decreases for the full specification as expected. For the full specification in Model XI, we see the lowest IDI coefficient (0.104) for the FX market, which also applies to the SUR coefficient (0.114).
The SUR and IDI coefficients are higher in the German and US stock markets compared to the FX and bond markets. From this, and due to the fact that all of the measures are standardized, we can conclude that news surprises and increasing abnormal noise is more likely to trigger jumps at stock markets than in bond futures or FX markets. Finally, the results of Table 7 demonstrate that our IDI measure remains significant, even when we exclude the SUR measure or the control variables or both. Hence, the likelihood of a jump not only depends on news surprises but also on abnormal information flow.
The fact that our information density indicator (IDI) corresponds highly with the probability of jumps allows us to interpret it as a valid measure to capture the level of noisy information prior to a public announcement. Note that otherwise, and under the assumption of the weak-form information efficiency hypothesis, we can expect that all of the price-relevant or news-related information would be immediately reflected in a price change. As a result no price jumps would occur at the release of the macroeconomic announcement, even when we control for news surprises. This is because all relevant information is already incorporated in the asset price.
The trading variable, Deals (DLS), is also significant at the 1 percent level for all five assets in all of the model specifications. The results for the volatility measure, V LA, are more ambiguous. V LA is significant for the Treasury Note and S&P Futures but not for the EUR/USD exchange rate or the German Bund and DAX Futures.
25 Moreover, in the full specification of Model XI, volatility only remains significant for the EUR/USD exchange rate. This is not surprising, since the SUR, as well as the IDI measure and, more importantly, the jump identification methodology, are denoted as standardized measures and thus, already controls for the current level of volatility. 26 To sum up, the empirical results confirm the theoretical hypothesis that the occurrence of abnormal noise prior to a public announcement significantly increases the probability of a price jump. Hence, there is strong empirical evidence for the existence of the effects that are considered in our theoretical model of noisy information.
Robustness Tests
In this section we carry out a series of robustness checks. Firstly, we apply a placebo test to control whether the information density indicator (IDI) also explains jumps that are unconditional to macroeconomic announcements. Therefore, we estimate the probit model specification for our dataset from which we excluded all of the time intervals that coincide with macroeconomic announcements. The results are shown in Panel A of Table  8 .
We find that the information density indicator is not significant in any specification of this placebo test. This confirms our assumption that, if information is not overlaid by a significant amount of noisy information, the uncertainty in the market is lower, and thus, the information precision is higher. However, our control variables for trading activity and volatility are highly significant and still explain the likelihood of jumps.
<<< Table 8 about here >>> Secondly, to test whether our IDI measure is contaminated by dominant macroeconomic indicators and announcement times, we re-run the regressions without the peaks in jumps at 08:30 and 10:00 EST (see Figure 1) , when many important macroeconomic announcements (in particular job market related indicators) are scheduled. This reduces our sample by about half. The results are reported in Table 8 Panel B. Our estimates remain robust, except for the EUR/USD market, where our IDI measure is no longer significant. Thirdly, we address the question of how co-announcements might affect our estimation results. 27 We focus on co-announcements, i.e., situations when we see more than one macroeconomic announcement within the same five-minute interval. In these instances, two effects can be observed: either the news surprises go into the same direction and thereby reinforce themselves, which can trigger a jump, or the news surprises are conflicting. In the latter case even large news surprises could be leveled out.
28 Table 8 Panel C shows the regression results for co-announcements without conflicting news surprises.
As expected, our model remains robust. In Table 8 Panel D, we report the regression results for co-announcements only for conflicting news. Neither our information density indicator nor news surprises are significant anymore. In this sense, our overall regression results that are reported above are a conservative estimate, as we did not exclude the co-announcements with conflicting news. In Panel E, we only show the results for single announcements. 29 The results confirm the findings derived when we exploit the whole dataset.
Fourthly, we test whether our IDI measure also explains the likelihood of co-jumps among asset prices. We expect that relatively more co-jumps can be linked to announcements than single jumps as they are caused by information rather than by similar liquidity in different markets (Bollerslev, Law, and Tauchen (2008) ).
30 However, in explaining cojumps, the role of the IDI measure is less clear. On the one hand, one could argue that news surprises should gain in relative importance to IDI. On the other hand, it could be the abnormal level of noise that facilitates the co-jumps in the first place.
As in Lahaye, Laurent, and Neely (2011) we formally define a co-jump as follows:
where I is an indicator function that becomes positive if a jump arises in at least two of our five asset markets.
To analyze the impact of news surprises and our information density indicator on co-jumps, we re-estimated Equation (15.2) as multinomial probit model for SUR and IDI conditional on macroeconomic announcements. To guarantee sufficient observations and to avoid spurious accuracy, we grouped the co-jumps into three alternative groups with no jumps as reference case (y = 0): only one jump as group 1 (y = 1), two and three co-jumps as group 2 (y = 2), and four and five co-jumps as group 3 (y = 3). The results are displayed in Table 9 .
<<< Table 9 about here >>> As we can see, both the SUR and IDI coefficients increase, when going from one jump only to two/three and four/five co-jumps (which are all highly significant). When it comes to explaining co-jumps, our IDI measure is not overshadowed by the importance of the macroeconomic surprise. Instead, it plays an increasing role in predicting the likelihood of co-jumps. 31 We attribute this finding to a higher aggregate uncertainty in the presence of a higher level of noisy information, as the cross-asset price discovery is increasingly hindered by the contamination of relevant signals by noise shocks.
Finally, we test whether particular years or the 2007/08 financial crisis affect the impact of the IDI measure on the likelihood of price jumps. To account for year effects and a potential impact of the financial crisis we added year dummies to our probit model. For the S&P, Treasury and Bund Futures we find no significant effects. For the latter years in our sample the year dummies for the FX market and the Bund Futures are significant. However, our model is still robust, i.e. the IDI as well as our news surprise and deals variables remain highly significant.
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Conclusions
Based on a theoretical framework, which includes both the emergence of noisy information prior to macroeconomic announcement and the release of the scheduled public announcement itself, we introduce an information density indicator (IDI). This allows us to empirically test the impact of news flows prior to macroeconomic announcements on price jumps. In its construction, the measure follows the liquidity shock variable of Jiang, Lo, and Verdelhan (2011) and measures the excess or abnormal level of noise.
In line with previous literature, we consider these information sets arriving at the market as a composition of price-relevant signals and price-irrelevant noise, where the latter prevents inference about the former. Assuming limits to relevant signals, we define abnormal noise by an increase in the amount of ticker information. The innovation in the modeling of noise as an exogenous information shock and representing it with a shock measure served us well in identifying the role of noise prior to announcements. Furthermore, the IDI opens up one direction to take into account the increasing bulk of information in the market.
By exploring a theoretical relationship between price jumps in financial markets and macroeconomic announcements, as well as other news, we followed a three-step estimation 31 We also run the estimation with the liquidity and volatility control variables for all five assets, as well as in various combinations. The qualitative results (increasing coefficients for SU R and IDI) remained unchanged. Due to high multicollinearity among the control variables in the multi-asset case, we do not report the results here. However, these are available from the authors upon request. 32 To conserve space, the results are not reported here but are available from the authors on request.
approach. In the first step, we identify jumps in five assets classes (U.S. and German bond and equity markets and the EUR/USD exchange rate), as proposed by Lee and Mykland (2008) . In the second step, we systematically link the jumps to macroeconomic announcements from the U.S., Germany, and the EMU. Finally, we explore the role of information (news surprise and information density prior to announcements) in triggering price jumps by simultaneously controlling for trading activity and volatility in a probit model specification.
The empirical results show that our information density indicator is independent of the magnitude of news surprise and pre-announcement trading activity, is highly significant across all of our five assets, and withstands several robustness checks. Even in the case of price co-jumps among our five assets, the IDI measure dominates the news surprise variable in importance and plays an increasing role in predicting the probability of a co-jump. We interpret this finding as a sign of rather unspecific uncertainty, which is finally resolved by the arrival of "hard" news in terms of a public announcement. This finding is attributed to the limited possibilities for market participants to infer signals from news flows in the presence of noise, which hinders price discovery. We also consider the placebo test result, i.e., an increase in noise alone without the arrival of an announcement does not trigger jumps, as a strong evidence for the theoretically derived effect of a malfunctioning price discovery process prior to announcements. This is resolved only when the hard facts hit the market, so that the price discovery after news increases without announcement in the following can be assumed to be more gradual in nature.
These results have strong implications when considering the increasing availability and presence of information in financial markets. As exogenous noisy information clouds price-relevant information (if any is contained in the news flow, which is not a necessary condition in our model setup), analysts' forecasts and other relevant fundamental signals may be diluted. This distorts the price discovery process and ultimately, challenges the assumptions on efficient markets. To guarantee a sufficient number of coordinated price jumps, we build three categories: one jump (y = 1), two and three jumps (y = 2), as well as four and five jumps (y = 3), with y = 0 as the reference group. Total number of observations n = 2927. To conserve space we do not show the coefficients for the controls "deals" and "volatility". HAC robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *** indicates statistically significance at the 1% level. This figure illustrates the construction of the Information Density Indicator (IDI) according to Equation (17) . Panel A shows the increase in noisy information (grey bars) prior to a public announcement (vertical grey dotted line), while Panel B shows the case when no abnormal news flow occurs. In comparison to the definition of the variable "Deals" in Equation (18), we define t − 1 as a ten-minute interval prior to the announcement. Because most of the announcements are released at the beginning of the five-minute interval t + 1, i.e. closely after t 0 , we estimate, in line with most jump literature, prices in the five-minute interval after the public announcement to guarantee a more stable measure as well as a more conservative approach. This figure plots the average intraday values (in EST) of the information density indicator (IDI) in the considered time period. Noisy news is defined as economically relevant information which is completely unrelated to both asset prices and macroeconomic announcements. Positive (negative) values of the IDI measure indicate a noise level above (below) a normal amount of noise. Note that the average value of IDI is above zero due to the fact that we use a ten-minute interval for t − 1 prior to the public announcement and standardize this value by subtracting the mean and standard deviation over the previous 25 minutes from t − 2 to t − 6 according to Equation (17).
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